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The story of the transformation of the Hague/Geneva rule
system into a modern vocabulary of political legitimacy can best
be told against the background of a widespread twentieth century
loss of faith in the formal distinctions of classical legal thought -
in the wisdom, as well as the plausibility and usefulness of
separating law sharply from politics, or private right shaping
from public power, or, for that matter, war from peace, civilian
from combatant... Developing an insider vocabulary common to
humanitarian and military professionals was intended to place
the new rules on afirm footing in the militarily plausible... To
this day, the most significant codifications of the law in war
have indeed been negotiated among diplomatic and military
authorities....
Humanitarian pragmatism has also brought a deeper
set of changes to the nineteenth-century law in war. The clear
distinctions that provided the background for so many of the
more detailed rules lost their luster. The rules themselves were
transformed into - or even replaced by - broad principles and
standards. Most importantly, the modern humanitarian and
military professionals have come to think about the status of
the law itself in new ways - less as an external or ex post
judge of military behaviour than as a vocabulary for
arguing about the legitimacy and illegitimacy of military
conduct common to those inside and outside the military
profession.
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Contemporary applications of the jus ad bellum have had
varying degrees of effectiveness in contributing to world public
order. The Nicaragua and Oil Platforms cases capsulize the classical
interpretation of the jus ad bellum in relation to the exercise of
the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.' It
could be argued, therefore, that the International Court's high
threshold for the lawful use of force in Article 51 situations
promotes "minimum order" or a minimization of unauthorized
violence and coercion. In Nicaragua and Oil Platforms, the
International Court of Justice emphasizes to States that the
general prohibition against the use of force in Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter is of constitutive importance to the maintenance of
international peace and security in the international system. By
imposing more stringent requirements and thus narrowing the
permitted context in which States could use force in individual
or collective self-defence, States might be substantially deterred
from engaging in unauthorized violence and coercion with other
States. Thus, insofar as "minimum order" is concerned, it could be
reasonably contended that the contemporary jus ad bellum under
the Charter era has been somewhat successful in containing the
frequency of open inter-state conflicts and acts of aggression.
The post-1945 reduction of instances of international
armed conflicts between States, however, does not correlatively
imply that international peace and security has been achieved. 2
"Minimum order" falls far short of the "optimum order" (or the
"arrangements that provide the greatest access of the individual
human being to the shaping and sharing of all values of human
dignity") needed for the achievement of lasting and stable peace
in the international system.' The classical interpretation in
Nicaragua and Oil Platforms of the jus ad bellum in relation to the
' Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits, Judgment); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J 161
(Judgment).
2 See CHRISTON I. ARCHER et al., World History of Warfare (2003).
MyRES S. McDOUGAL & SIEGFRIED WIESSNER, Law and Minimun World Public
Order, in International Law of War (Myres S. McDougal & Florentino Feliciano, 1994).
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right to self-defence under Article 51 poses significant problems
in interpretation and enforcement that derail the achievement of
"optimum order."
For one, the problematic interpretation of Article 51
in Nicaragua and Oil Platforms makes it difficult for States to
legitimately use force in vindication of their right to individual or
collective self-defence. Nicaragua and Oil Platforms both held that
an "armed attack" contemplated in Article 51 refers only to "the
most grave forms of force," and patterns of low intensity attacks
or transborder incursions could not be cumulated to approximate
that standard. (The Court drew a similar conclusion in Armed
Activities in Congo,4 where the Court also held Uganda to the same
high standard of an "armed attack," and declared that Uganda's
incursion into Congolese territory to disable the FUNA safe havens
was not a justified use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter.)
Moreover, a State exercising its right to self-defence must issue
an official declaration that it is a victim State, and immediately
report its action to the UN Security Council pursuant to Article 51.
Finally, the victim State's use of force must only be made out of
the "military necessity" of stopping or halting the attack. Such use
of force must be "proportionate," or only that sufficient to stop an
ongoing attack. These rigid conceptual thresholds for the lawful
use of force under Article 51 inimitably limits the policy choices
available to States facing the threat of aggression or armed attack.
Under the classical interpretation of Article 51 in Nicaragua and
Oil Platforms, States would have to wait to absorb the "most grave
forms of force" in an armed attack before they can even begin to
deploy any force in self-defence. As rightly suggested by Judge
Schwebel in his dissenting opinion in Nicaragua, this expectation
myopically disregards the realpolitik of international relations.
States cannot reasonably satisfy their internal constituencies with
static and passive approaches to security policy. Rigid insistence
Case Concerning Armed Activities in the Congo (Congo v. Uganda),
19 December 2005 General List No. 116, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/ 116/10455.pdf>.
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on the classical interpretation of the use of force in self-defence
thus threatens to diminish the relevance of international law to
the authoritative decision-making processes of international
policy-makers.
Even when the classical interpretation of Article 51
has been applied to conclude that a State's use of force is
unlawful, the coarchical structure of the international system
can also be prohibitive to imposing any genuine sanctions for
the unlawful use of force. In the Corfu Channel case,' while
the International Court of Justice declared that the United
Kingdom's minesweeping operations in Albania could not be
justified as a lawful use of force in exercise of the right to self-
defence, the International Court did not have any enforcement
powers to sanction the United Kingdom for the international
violation. If the classical interpretation of the use of force for
self-defence purposes is already problematically inflexible and
there is no clear enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance
with the classical interpretation, it is more than probable that
States anticipating aggression or facing the threat of aggression
would act in ways that preserve their security even if these
do not always adhere to "codified" international law under
Article 51.
Modern interpretations of the jus ad bellum therefore
recognize acceptable variants beyond the classical reactive
interpretation to Article 51. Anticipatory self-defence substitutes
the objective requirement of an "armed attack" with a State's
verifiable perception of a threat of such attack "that, in the sole
judgment of the state believing itself about to become a target, was
so palpable, imminent, and prospectively destructive that the only
defence was its prevention." This reasoning hearkens back to the
British position in the 1837 Caroline incident.6 Other modern jus
ad bellum variants include "preemptive self-defence" (the claim to
s Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment).
6 Id.; See also DAVID A. SADOFF, A Question of Determinacy: The Legal Status of
Anticipatory Self-Defence, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 523 (2009).
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a unilateral use of force without prior international authorization,
involving a palpable and imminent threat, in order to "arrest an
incipient development that is not yet operational, hence not yet
directly threatening, but that, if permitted to mature, could then
be neutralized only at a higher and possibly unacceptable cost")
and its more controversial corollary of "regime change" (which is
a form of pro-democracy use of force).'
Finally, a significant modern jus ad bellum principle
which is not anchored on an Article 51 derivative (but which
is also designed to achieve optimum order), is the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention.' Humanitarian intervention is a form
of unilateral action without prior Security Council authorization
in order to stop genocide, torture, and other egregious human
rights violations, as was undertaken in 1999 by NATO forces in
Kosovo. Its most recent permutation on the "responsibility to
protect" appears to redirect humanitarian intervention within
the control of the Security Council through the mechanism of
Chapter VII.9
I Id.; See W. MICHAEL REISMAN AND ANDREA ARMSTRONG, The Past and Future of
the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 Am. J. Int'l L. 525 (2006); OSCAR SCHACTER,
The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984).
8 W. MICHAEL REISMAN & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, Humanitarian Intervention
and the United Nations (1973).
9 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 139: "The international community,
through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of
the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation
with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the
need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate,
to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which
are under stress before crises and conflicts break out."
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What is common among these modern jus ad bellum
variants is their teleological appeal to the underlying operative
bases of the use of force, and their consciousness of the
importance of reserving flexibility to States in forming their
security policies within the intricacies of the international
system, as well as considering the limited competencies of
international institutional actors such as the United Nations and
its organs. These modern jus ad bellum variants' consideration
for the expectations of international actors arguably presents
political arrangements that aspire to achieve "optimum order,"
and not merely the reduction of the occurrence of hostilities in
"minimum order."
Interestingly, new surveillance technologies provoke
some space for rethinking on possible interpretive nuances to
contemporary jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Special electronic
and reconnaissance aircraft are "increasingly producing their
information in realtime. Thus, whereas in the past a photographic
reconnaissance had to land to enable its film to be taken to be
processed and interpreted, today the information is transmitted
in digital electronic form as it is gained, thus saving a great deal
of time. This, in turn, enables the information to be interpreted in
the hands of the operations staff much more rapidly so that they
can respond in a timely and appropriate manner." 0 Examples
of these new models of special and reconnaissance aircraft and
their corresponding surveillance capabilities include:
Boeing E-3 Sentry: "The dome contains the transmitting
and receiving elements of the Westinghouse AN/ APY-2
radar, which provide coverage of the earth's surface up
into the stratosphere, over land or water, and out to
a range of more than 250 miles for low-flying targets
and much further for aircraft flying at high to medium
altitudes. The radar includes Identification Friend or
1o DAVID MILLER, Modern American Weapons 158 (2002).
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Foe (IFF) sub-system and these sensors, in conjunction
with a powerful computer, enable the operators to
perform surveillance, identification, weapons control,
battle management, and communications functions
in real time. Tracks are classified into land, air or sea,
friendly or hostile, and data downlinks enable all the
information to be passed to US military command and
control centers in rear areas or aboard ships, or, in time
of crisis, to the National Command Authorities... E-3s
are among the first assets to be deployed in any crisis.
In Operations Desert Shield/Storm, for example, they
flew more than 400 missions, logging more than 5000
hours of on-station time, to provide radar surveillance
and control for more than 120,000 Coalition sorties.
The support provided ranged from giving senior
leadership time-critical information on enemy actions
to participating in 38 of the 40 air-to-air kills recorded
during the conflict. In addition, they provided, for the
first time in the history of aerial warfare, a recording of
the entire air campaign. Such a high-value system has
only been released to a few, carefully selected allies:
NATO (17), France (4), Saudi Arabia (5) and the United
Kingdom (6), while Japan operates the same AWACS
system, but installed on a Boeing 767 platform.""
Boeing E-4B: "The Boeing E-4B uses the commercial
Boeing 747-200 airframe, but with considerable
internal alterations to suit it for its role as the United
States' National Emergency Airborne Command Post
(NEACP). This means that in case of national emergency
or the destruction of ground command and control
centers, the aircraft will provide a modern, highly
survivable, command, control, and communications
center to direct US forces, execute emergency war
" Id., at 160-163.
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orders, and coordinate actions by civil authorities.
Its most recent use in this role was on 11 September
2000 when President Bush spent some hours airborne
taking command of US resources until the extent of the
terrorist attacks was known... The E-4B has state-of-the-
art electronic and communications equipment, and is
fitted with shielding against nuclear and thermal effects.
Its electrical and electronic systems are also shielded
against the effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP), one
of the major effects of a high airburst nuclear weapon,
to which such a high-flying aircraft would otherwise
be very vulnerable. The aircraft also carries advanced
satellite communications systems to provide worldwide
communications coverage."12
* Boeing E-6A/B Mercury: "When ballistic missile sub-
marines (SSBNs) are on patrol the depth of water makes
it difficult to pass messages to them from the National
Command Authority, except by Very Low Frequency
(VLF) radio, which requires an airborne relay station
equipped with very long trailing-wire antennae
(TWAs)... The E-6A's primary mission is to broadcast on
the VLF band which requires two vertically polarized
very long trailing-wire antenna (TWAs)."13
* Lockheed Martin EC-130H Compass Call/Rivet Fire: "The
EC-130H Compass Call is a version of the Lockheed
C-130 Hercules adapted for use as a tactical command,
control, and communications countermeasures
platform. Electronic attacks on hostile command and
control systems provide friendly commanders with
an immense advantage before and during the air
campaign. Among the means the Compass Call uses is
noise jamming to prevent communication or to degrade
12 Id., at 164-165.
'a Id., at 166 and 169.
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the transfer of information essential to enemy command
and control of weapon systems and other resources.
Although the aircraft's primary mission is support of
tactical operations it can also provide jamming support
to ground force operations. Modifications to the aircraft
include an electronic countermeasures system (Rivet
Fire), air-refueling capability, and associated navigation
and communications systems."14
* Boeing/Raytheon RC-135V/W Rivet Joint: "Both these
Rivet Joint types are fitted with sophisticated intel-
ligence gathering equipment, designed to enable
military specialists to monitor the electronic activity of
potential and actual adversaries. This involves ELINT
and COMINT intercepts of hostile activity at ranges
of up to about 150 miles in order to give information
about the location and intentions of enemy forces.
They are also required to originate voice broadcasts,
the highest priorities being imminent threat warnings
direct to aircraft in danger and 'combat advisories' to
warn general areas. They also operate data and voice
links to provide target information to ground-based US
air defense forces.... the RC-135S are being constantly
upgraded. Current known programs for the Rivet Joint
systems include Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL),
High- and Low- Band Subsystem (LBSS) various
antenna improvements and installation of more
advanced direction-finding equipment, and enhanced
data links."15
* Lockheed Martin EP-3E (ARIES II): "The EP-3E ARIES II
has a large radome under the forward fuselage, a ventral
radome, numerous small antennae, and a shortened
tailboom. Internally it houses direction-finding (DFI)
14 Id., at 170-171.
15 Id., at 172.
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equipment; signals gathering, analysis and recording
equipment; and their own real-time communications
equipment... EP-3Es have been heavily engaged in
reconnaissance in support of NATO forces in Bosnia,
and joint forces in Korea and in Operation Southern
Watch, Northern Watch, and Allied Force. Normally,
these operations are shrouded in secrecy, but one hit the
world's headlines on 1 April 2001 when it was involved
in a major incident with two fighters of the Chinese
PLA-Air Force."1 6
Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler: "The EA-6B's ALQ-
99's first task is to collect data to enable the enemy's
electronic order of battle (EOB) to be complied
then disseminated via a real-time downlink to the
command-and-control system. The next task is to
jam enemy electronic systems, particularly radar in
support of friendly air and ground operations. Third,
the EA-6B can contribute to the SEAD (suppression
of enemy air defenses) campaign by using its HARM
missiles. Atop the EA-6B's tail fin is a large pod which
houses a number of Systems Integration Receivers
(SIRs), with four more in bulges on the fin. The
SIRs, each covering a discrete frequency band, detect
hostile radar emissions at long range and the emitter
information is processed by the central mission
computer, with detection, identification, direction-
funding, and jammer-set-on-sequence operations
performed automatically or by the crew."' 7
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) such as the RQ-1
Predator and RQ-2 Pioneer: "The RQ-1 Predator is a
USAF-operated system which is normally employed
in moderate risk areas. Each system comprises four
16 Id., at 176-177.
17 Id., at 191.
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airborne platforms with their related sensors, a ground
control system (GCS), a satellite communications suite
and fifty-five people, all of which must be collocated
on the same airfield, with a hard surface runway
measuring 5000 x 125 ft. The aircraft carries three
cameras transmitting full motion video - one in the
nose, normally used by the flight controller, a daylight
TV camera, and a low light/night infrared camera -
together with a synthetic aperture radar for looking
through smoke, cloud, or haze. The cameras produce
full motion video and the synthetic aperture radar
produces still-frame radar images.... The RQ-1 can
operate at 25,000 ft, but typically flies at around 15,000
ft with a normal mission involving a 400 nm transit,
followed by 14 hours on station."18
Considering these rapid developments in electro-optic
surveillance systems, radio surveillance systems and long-
range satellite and video surveillance systems now available
as part of modem military arsenals, should international law
simply abandon the enterprise of jus in bello altogether since
the determinacy of legal rules is at risk with the revolutionizing
scope of war data?
The answer should be relatively straightforward. Even where
technological trajectories alter military capabilities, States remain
susceptible to international legal regulation on the conduct of
hostilities." Technologies aid in the closest possible identification
1s Id., at 200-201.
19 See et al: 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of
War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight; 1899 Hague Declaration
Concerning Asphyxiating Gases; 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding
Bullets; 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare; 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare; 1978 Red Cross Fundamental Rules of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts; 1980 United Nations Convention
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, including
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of military targets; the careful assessment of the reasonable effects
of coercive action on combatants and non-combatants, properties,
and potential collateral damage; and the overall implementation
of a State's foreign policy objectives through the military
instrument. In this sense, technologies provide factual tools that
support the policy calculus of the international decision-maker,
but technologies themselves cannot render immaterial the legal
proscriptions and prescriptions on the conduct of hostilities. I
proceed from the claim that technological developments would
only call for a re-calibration of how jus ad bellum and jus in
bello norms are applied. New surveillance technologies do not
eliminate the rigorous task of determining nuances in the core
principles of jus in bello.
The laws of war can be identified and applied to the single
case of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons.
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 20 the International Court of Justice explicitly
affirmed "the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear
weapons," even if "nuclear weapons were invented after most of
the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflict had already come into existence; the Conferences of 1949
and 1974-1977 left these weapons aside, and there is a qualitative
as well as quantitative difference between nuclear weapons and
all conventional arms. However, it cannot be concluded from
this that the established principles and rules of humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflict did not apply to nuclear weapons.
Such a conclusion would be incompatible with the intrinsically
1980 Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments, 1980 Protocol II on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, 1980 Protocol III
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, 1995 Protocol IV on
Blinding Laser Weapons, 1996 Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices; 1997 Ottawa Convention on
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction.
I Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 226, at paras. 85
to 89.
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humanitarian character of the legal principles in question which
permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to allforms
of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those
of the present, and those of the future..."21 The Court considered
the Martens Clause" as further proof of the applicability of the
principles and rules of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons. (It
should be stressed, however, that while it deemed jus in bello
protections to be applicable, the Court ultimately did not reach a
definitive conclusion on the application of jus in bello principles of
distinction, neutrality, necessity, among others, in the particular
case of nuclear weapons?.) What is implicit from the Court's
reasoning in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
is the understanding that technological innovation affecting
the military instrument does not make legal norms regulating
the conduct of hostilities inapplicable. The continuing salience
of these norms depends, in large measure, on the reasonable
21 Id., at para. 86. Emphasis and italics supplied. Note, however, that the Court
expressly acknowledged here that "the thesis that the rules of humanitarian law do not
apply to the new weaponry, because of the newness of the latter, has not been advo-
cated in the present proceedings. On the contrary, the newness of nuclear weapons
has been expressly rejected as an argument against the application to them of inter-
national humanitarian law."
I See RUPERT TICEHURST, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 125-134, at <http://www.icrc.org/web/
eng/siteengO.nsf/html/57JNHY>.
'3 Id., at note 1, at para. 95: "Nor can the Court make a determination on
the validity of the view that the recourse to nuclear weapons would be illegal in
any circumstance owing to their inherent and total incompatibility with the law
applicable in armed conflict. Certainly, as the Court has already indicated, the
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict-at the heart of which is
the overriding consideration of humanity -make the conduct of armed hostilities
subject to a number of strict requirements. Thus, methods and means of warfare,
which would preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets, or
which would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited. In view
of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, to which the Court has referred
above, the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for
such requirements. Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have sufficient
elenents to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons
would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable to
armed conflict in any circumstance." (Emphasis supplied.)
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elasticity of each norm's substantive content, when applied by
international decision-makers to particular fact patterns within
situations of armed conflict.
If legal norms regulating the conduct of hostilities
arguably apply to weapons of mass destruction, they apply
with more reason when viewed in conjunction with new
surveillance technologies. Modern surveillance techniqueS24
introduce a new dimension to the expectations of international
actors on the width, reach, and translation of jus in bello and
jus ad bellum principles to particular conflict situations.
Considering the erosion of the strict divide between jus in
bello and jus ad bellum, 25 increasing the universal accessibility
to new surveillance technologies should correspondingly
cause conflict actors to expect a reasonable readjustment of
conceptual limits within jus ad bellum tests (e.g. the definition
of an "armed attack," the principle of military necessity, and
the principle of proportionality) and jus in bello principles (e.g.
distinction or discrimination, necessity, proportionality). 2 6
This should qualitatively influence both the application of
the laws regulating hostilities in the specific conflict situs or
controversy, while, at the same time, shape the customary
content of these laws for future hostilities. If States and other
conflict actors can secure access to more developed surveillance
technologies that enable better scrutiny of the use of the
military instrument in conflict situations, it is not unlikely that
their respective margins of appreciation for the cumulative
principles regulating the conduct of hostilities would be much
24 See J.K. PETERSEN, UNDERSTANDING SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES: SPY DEVICES,
PRIVACY, HISTORY & APPLICATIONS (2 nd ed., 2007); JENNIFER ELSEA ET AL., MILITARY
TRANSFORMATION: CURRENT ISSUES IN INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISANCE
(2003).
5 ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, Overlap and Convergence: The Interaction
between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 157 (2007).
26 See however ROBERT D. SLOANE, The Cost ofConflation: Preserving the Dualism
ofJus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 47
(2008).
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wider than currently tolerated in positivist international law
and jurisprudence. New surveillance technologies will not just
facilitate transparent and open contestation on the content of
jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles, but the likely turnover
towards more nuanced interpretations of these principles would
conceivably be faster.
I submit that new surveillance technologies would empower
international decision-makers to make closer cumulative
assessments of legality from both jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
In turn, other international actors possessing access to the same
technologies could better police or challenge the subjective and
objective components to these assessments. (By "subjective,"
I refer to the international decision-maker's policy objectives
in undertaking coercive action; and by "objective" I refer to
internationally accepted aspects of the legal standard regulating
the conduct of hostilities.) Assuming all conflict actors have
access to the same surveillance technologies, the end result should
be increased determinacy of the laws regulating the conduct
of hostilities, and ultimately, greater outcome-predictability.
The following subsections briefly discuss possible qualitative
adjustments in jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles.
Jus Ad Bellum Principles
"Armed attack" and the right of self-defence
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter requires "[a]
11 Members [to] refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." In the Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,2 7 the
I Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 13.
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International Court of Justice jointly examined the prohibition
against intervention and the scope of the prohibition against the
use of force. Acts constituting a breach of the principle of non-
intervention could also breach the prohibition against the use of
force if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force.2 To
recall in this case, the Court declared that the United States' aid
to the contras in Nicaragua (specifically, arming and training of
the contras) amounted to a breach not just of the principle of non-
intervention but also the prohibition against the use of force.29
Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, however, self-defence
(whether individual or collective) operates as the exception to the
prohibition against the use of force.30 According to the Court in
Nicaragua, before a use of force could be characterized as a lawful
act of self-defence, an armed attack must have occurred, and "it
is evident that it is the victim State, being most directly aware of
the fact, which is likely to draw general attention to its plight. It is
also evident that if the victim State wishes another State to come
to its help in the exercise of the right of collective self-defence, it
will normally make an express request to that effect." 1 Moreover,
where States use force in exercise of their right to self-defence,
Article 51 obliges them to report their actions to the Security
I See Corfu Channel 1949 ICJ 4 (Merits), at paras. 32-35: "The Court can only
regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such
as has, in the past, given rise to the most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever
be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law.
Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take here;
for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and
might easily lead to perverting the administration of justice itself."
9 Id., at para. 228.
3 Art. 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
inter- national peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security."
1 Id., at para. 232.
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Council. The absence of such a report could be taken as a factor
indicating "whether the State in question was itself convinced
that it was acting in self-defence."3 2
Due to evidentiary insufficiency, the Court refused to
conclude that the 1982,1983, and 1984 transborder incursions into
the territories of Honduras and Costa Rica were at all imputable
to Nicaragua." It also took into account various circumstances
negating the legitimate exercise of self-defence -El Salvador's
much-belated official declaration that it was a victim of an
armed attack; the silence of Honduras and Costa Rica in their
communications to the Court regarding the occurrence of an
armed attack; and the failure of the United States to render a
report as required under Article 51 that it was using force in
exercise of the right of collective self-defence. 4 Consequently,
the Court refused to conclude that the repeated transborder
incursions amounted to an "armed attack" justifying the plea
of collective self-defence within the meaning of Article 51.
Notwithstanding the admittedly sequential occurrence of the
transborder incursions, the Court majority refused to view
Nicaragua's acts cumulatively as amounting to an "armed
attack."5
The result of the Court's methodology in Nicaragua was
to impose a high evidentiary and substantive threshold for a
lawful use of force within the meaning of Article 51. The Court
further perpetuated this threshold in the Case Concerning Oil
Platforms,36 ruling that Nicaragua had created a definitional
standard of "armed attack" as one involving "the most grave
32 Id., at para. 200.
3 Id., at para. 231.
- Id., at paras. 233-236.
5 See Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion, paras. 6, 13-14, at 13: "1 find
the Court's interpretation of what is tantamount to an armed attack, and of the
consequential law, inconsonant with accepted international law and with the realities
of international relations. And I find its holdings as to what El Salvador and the
United States actually did inconsistent with the facts."
3 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ No. 90 (Merits), at
para. 51. Emphasis supplied.
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forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack)
from other less grave forms, since in the case of individual self-
defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned
having been the victim of an armed attack." In Oil Platforms, the
Court also refused to treat cumulative Iranian attacks on United
States vessels as an "armed attack." The attenuated period of
time between the Iranian attacks and the United States' military
response through "Operation Praying Mantis," also militated
against characterizing the United States' use of force as a
legitimate exercise of the right to self-defence.
As seen from Nicaragua and Oil Platforms, the Court's
assessment of "armed attack" and the right of self-defence within
Article 51 depends most crucially on several perception-driven
factual indicators: (1) the justifiability and timing of a State's
official declaration that it is the victim of an armed attack; (2) the
visibly apparent "gravity" of the use of force as would constitute
an armed attack; and (3) the seeming urgency of using force
(whether for individual or collective self-defence) as evidenced
by a report to the UN Security Council. In all three indicators,
the Court lays a high bar for what constitutes an "armed attack"
and a proper invocation of the right to self-defence - mainly
because of a factual or perceptual discontinuity. Nicaragua and
Oil Platforms problematically showed that an attacking State's
(apparent) low-intensity uses of force and its repeated iterations
over time, when taken together with the victim State's delay (in
declaring that it is the victim of an armed attack, undertaking
coercive action in exercise of its right to self-defence, and then
reporting the same to the UN Security Council) - could preclude
the determination that an "armed attack" occurred as would
justify the lawful use of force under international law.
These neat categories, however, do not comport with
the operational realities of State conduct during international
hostilities. For one, there is an inevitable time lag between a
State's intelligence-gathering and fact-finding before it reaches
its subjective conclusion that it is the victim of an armed attack
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attributable to a particular State. There is also an obvious time lag
between the State's determination of the existence of an "armed
attack" and the State's planning and execution of appropriate
policy responses. Finally, if the victim State does undertake an
Article 51 use of force, there will necessarily be an intervening
period until the termination of its military operations, and the
State's evaluation of whether the operation accomplished its
policy objectives, before the State could even reasonably prepare
and submit a report to the Security Council. All of these actions
entail decision-making processes that do not coincide with the
Nicaragua and Oil Platforms black-letter definitions of an "armed
attack" and the rigorous processes of exercising the right to self-
defence.
Following from the Court's reasoning in Nicaragua and Oil
Platforms, however, there would never be a "victim State" unless
an attack singularly involves "the most grave forms of force;"
the victim State immediately declares that it is being attacked by
a particular State; and the victim State immediately devises and
executes a coercive military response while publicizing its action
through a report to the Security Council. For this reason, the
divergence between the Court's perceptions and that of the states
involved in Nicaragua and Oil Platforms tilted the applicability of
a lawful use of force under Article 51 towards a very narrow fact
situation. Where the Court did not appear satisfied with the
evidence before it due to these perceptual differences (or holding
that the evidence appeared "inconclusive"), it instead chose to
rule on the illegality of the "victim" State's use of force. This
judicial policy unjustly burdens victim States who have already
suffered the effects of hostile conduct (whether through iterative
attacks on vessels in Oil Platforms or transborder incursions
as in Nicaragua) to further bear the (likely) consequence of a
(procedural) denial of justice."
3 See JAN PAULSSON, Denial offustice in International Law (2005).
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In this sense, new surveillance technologies could
ameliorate the perceptual differences between international
adjudicators and international decision-makers on what truly
constitutes an "armed attack," and what indicators show that
there is a lawful exercise of the right to self-defence. Assuming
all actors' access to the comparable surveillance technologies,
it should be possible to justify the cumulation of low-intensity
attacks as an "armed attack" (cumulation being a method that
the Court did not rule out in Oil Platforms, para. 64), and more
verifiably impute such low-intensity attacks to a particular
State or non-State actor. Better surveillance technologies would
enable international adjudicators to more closely discern the
subjective intent of international decision-makers, particularly
on the policy options available to them (e.g. strategic diplomacy,
military responses, etc.) at the time of the "armed attack," and
the time available to them within which to use force in exercise of
their right to self-defence. Increasing access to new surveillance
technologies encourages a more nuanced understanding of
"armed attack" and "right to self-defence" under Article 51, by
adjusting the relative expectations of the conflict parties and their
respective authoritative decision-makers. Most importantly, new
surveillance technologies makes it fairly easier for international
adjudicators to examine both the subjective and objective factors
behind the concepts of "armed attack" and the Article 51 process
on the exercise of the right to self-defence. With the availability
of information from new surveillance technologies, international
adjudicators could be better equipped to define and apply the
concepts of "armed attack" and the Article 51 "right to self-
defence" within a wider zone of reasonableness 8 that coheres
with the expectations in international actors.
I See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 82, 83-90 (2003); STEPHANIE A. BARBOUR AND ZOE A. SALZMAN, The Tangled
Web: The Right of Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors in the Armed Activities Case, 40
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 53 (2008).
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Principles of Military Necessity and Proportionality
The 1837 Caroline incident (which involved a pre-emptive
attack by British forces in Canada on a ship manned by Canadian
rebels who were planning an attack from United States territory)
is frequently cited as the initial authoritative articulation of the
principles of military necessity and proportionality in relation
to self-defence." The principle of military necessity looks to the
objective rationale for the use of force in exercising the right
to self-defence, which should not be retaliatory or punitive
but simply intended to halt or repel attack.4 0 The principle of
proportionality, on the other hand, weighs the level of force
employed by the victim State to accomplish the objective of
self-defence.41 In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,42
the Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support
Uganda's claim to self-defence in seeking to halt the transborder
incursions of the Former Uganda National Army from safe
havens within Congolese territory. The Court looked at the
scale of FUNA attacks on Uganda, and, applying the same
Nicaragua threshold of "most grave uses of force" to constitute
"armed attacks" under Article 51, concluded that Uganda's use
of force was not justified. The Court factually observed that
"the taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometres
from Uganda's border would not seem proportionate..., nor to
be necessary to that end." 43
As with the definitions of armed attack and the right of self-
defence under Article 51, controversies on the scope of military
necessity and proportionality of an Article 51 use of force likewise
I See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 120 (2004).
40 WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, The Meaning of Military Necessity in International Law,
1 WORLD POLITY 109, 113 (1957).
41 JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STA-
TEs (2004).
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depends on accurate perceptions between conflict actors (and
their respective decision-makers). New surveillance technologies
could thus qualitatively alter international adjudicators' margins
of appreciation for what constitutes a "military necessity." In the
case of low-intensity iterated attacks attributable to a particular
international actor, a victim State's military response after the
"Nth" iteration could be acceptably characterized as an act of
"military necessity." Likewise, the proportionality of the means
employed in the use of force by the Victim State could be better
calibrated alongside the long-term objective of self-defence.4 4
In the case of the factual observation in Armed Activities, if
surveillance technologies definitively established that FUNA
safe havens in Congolese territory indeed enabled the repeated
transborder attacks, then a stronger argument might have been
made in favour of the proportionality of Uganda's military
incursion into Congolese territory for the purpose of disabling the
FUNA safe havens. Proportionality in the case of jus ad bellum
thus takes a more panoramic view of the Victim State's overall
self-defence policy, and the minimum use of force required to
effectuate such a policy. New surveillance technologies would
enable international adjudicators to better contextualize the
victim State's decision-making processes on the scope and
duration of its use of force in relation to the overriding objective
of self-defence.
Jus in Bello Principles
Principle of Distinction or Discrimination
(Military v. Civilian Targets)
In their use of military force, parties to armed conflict have
a duty to distinguish between combatants and non-combatant
I See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, The Doctrine of Proportionality in Time of War,
16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 457 (2007).
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civilian targets.45 The process of distinguishing direct military
participants and valid military targets from non-combatants
civilian individuals, groups, and properties, implicates interna-
tional decision-makers' modalities of judgment within situations
of contingency, leaving less time for deliberation than in peace-
time, and mainly depending on the operative availability of
reliable intelligence. New surveillance technologies can have a
significant impact on the ability to distinguish between clearly
lawful military targets from 'doubtful' cases where civilians
effectively become "unlawful combatants." International adju-
dicators' qualitative assessments on an individual's direct partici-
pation in the hostilities, as opposed to merely incidental or
inadvertent contributions to the war effort, could be more clearly
delineated with increased universal access to new surveillance
technologies."
Principles of Necessity vis-a-vis Proportionality:
Doctrine of Collateral Damage and Prohibitions
Against Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering
Unlike the more topographic view of casus belli (a State's
justification for its use of force under the principles of jus ad bellum),
the principle of necessity in jus in bello is more microscopically
understood as a concept that forestalls unrestrained barbarity
among combatants, balancing fundamental needs of humanity
4 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Art.
51(3), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, Art. 13(3), 8 June 1977, 1125
UNTS 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
46 On the distinctions between direct participation and mere contribution
to the war effort, see Commentary on Protocol I, art. 53, in Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
619 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmermann, eds., 1987).
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against the strategic desire for military victory.47 There is, how-
ever, no strict dichotomy between jus ad bellum necessity and jus
in bello necessity: "The rules of jus in bello are designed in a way
measuring the advantage of the belligerent state derived from the
concept of military necessity against the concepts of humanity
and proportionality. The very concept of such necessity, which
is the measure of the propriety of the exercise of belligerent
actions, relates to the advantage that the belligerent may derive
in pursuing his campaign and achieving the goals for which he is
fighting. In the case of the aggressor, this is the reason for which
it started the war, that is the very act of aggression. Thus, the
military necessity under just in bello is by no means a free-standing
concept, but is linked to the very cause of the relevant conflict and
thus, is an emanation of the causes of war under jus ad bellum.
This is yet another confirmation that the complete separation of
the two bodies of law is impossible. There can be no two sets of
rules one of which says that the aggressor state is responsible for
its aggression and damage caused thereby, and another says that
the same state is not responsible for that damage which it caused
during the same aggressive war through its actions within the
military necessity."8 Finally, in much the same way that military
necessity and proportionality are tested jointly in jus ad bellum,
the principle of necessity is generally understood in conjunction
with the principle of proportionality.
Proportionality in jus in bello looks at the consistency or
fit between the means and methods of warfare, and the military
objective sought to be accomplished. With respect to objects,
military objectives "are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution
to military action and whose total, or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage." 49 The principle of proportionality
41 See CRAIG J.S. FORREST, The Doctrine of Military Necessity and the Protection of
Cultural Property During Armed Conflicts, 37 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 177 (2007).
4* Id.
4 Art. 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949.
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animates precautionary measures and the duty of care required
under Article 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions:
Article 57.-Precautions in attack
1. In the conduct of military operations, constant
care shall be taken to spare the civilian population,
civilians, and civilian objects.
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions
shall be taken:
(a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack
shall:
(i) Do everything feasible to verify that
the objectives to be attacked are neither
civilians nor civilian objects and are
not subject to special protection but are
military objectives within the meaning
of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is
not prohibited by the provisions of this
Protocol to attack them;
(ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice
of means and methods of attack with a
view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, and damage to
civilian objects;
(iii) Refrain from deciding to launch any
attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated;
(b) An attack shall be cancelled or suspended
if it becomes apparent that the objective is
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not a military one or is subject to special
protection or that the attack may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated;
(c) Effective advance warning shall be given
for attacks which may affect the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not
permit.
3. When a choice is possible between several
military objectives for obtaining a similar military
advantage, the objective to be selected shall be
that the attack on which may be expected to cause
the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian
objects.
4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or
in the air, each Party to the conflict shall, in
conformity with its rights and duties under the
rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid
losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian
objects.
5. No provision of this Article may be construed
as authorizing any attacks against the civilian
population, civilians or civilian objects.
Significantly in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel,50
the Israeli Supreme Court declared that proportionality is
recognized as a "general principle of international law" which
applies even to the duties of a military occupier: "the means that
the administrative body uses must be constructed to achieve the
0 HCJ 2056/04, Israeli Supreme Court, 30 June 2004; See also Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
2004 I.C.J. No. 131 (Advisory Opinion).
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precise objective that the administrative body is trying to achieve.
The means used by the administrative body must rationally
lead to the realization of the objective." Moreover, "the means
used by the administrative body must injure the individual to
the least extent possible. In the spectrum of means that can be
used to achieve the objective, the least injurious means must
be used." Finally, "the damage caused to the individual by the
means used by the administrative body in order to achieve its
objectives must be of proper proportion to the gain brought
about by that means." These principles, as applied by the Israeli
Supreme Court, analogously refer to the jus in bello principle
of proportionality in relation to the doctrine of collateral
damage and the prohibitions against superfluous injury and
unnecessary suffering.
Access to new surveillance technologies may thus call
for a different necessity-proportionality metric than has
been traditionally conceptualized in conventional warfare.
An international adjudicator's after-the-fact assessment of a
military action (e.g. its achievement of a specified military
objective, inflicting the least possible collateral damage, if any,
and carefully avoiding the infliction of superfluous injury and
unnecessary suffering) could more realistically be aligned with
the expectations of the conflict actors within the specific time
and fact horizon in which the military action is undertaken.5 1
In sum, the above subsections on jus ad bellum and jus in
bello principles illustrate the possible qualitative adjustments
that an international decision-maker could foreseeably make
with the introduction of new surveillance technologies. Techno-
logical advances, where comparable among international
actors, make these kinds of fact-based contextual calibrations
possible for international adjudicators. Asymmetries in access
to these new surveillance technologies, however, could be
"dangerous" in the sense meant by international lawyer Charles
51 See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 381
(1997).
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De Visscher when he alluded to a restatement of the laws of
war by international jurists.52 Aggressors may be paradoxically
held to a lower evidentiary threshold than victim States. Victim
States may also end up assuming conversely disproportionate
evidentiary burdens in jus ad bellum and jus in bello. While a
victim State with access to cutting-edge surveillance technology
could find itself enabled to make a better case that an "armed
attack" has transpired under which it can lawfully exercise its
Article 51 right of self-defence, it may also end up hampered by
more restrictions to the available means and methods of warfare
that it can legitimately use in a theatre of war.
52 CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1968).
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